Recent months have seen an escalation of Houthi attacks on ships transiting the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the strategic maritime corridor connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. While the Houthis portray their actions as targeted responses to Israel’s military actions in Gaza, reality has demonstrated a far less precise—and far less effective—strategy.
The Houthis argue that these shipping attacks and their imposed pseudo-blockade are laser-focused exclusively on vessels associated directly or indirectly with Israel and its allies. They frame their military actions as responses to alleged “genocide” in Gaza, promising that the siege will end as soon as Israel halts its offensive. On paper, such logic seems simple, even morally compelling. However, in practice, their claim swiftly collapses under scrutiny.
First and foremost, the Houthi narrative conflicts starkly with facts on the ground. Far from carefully picking shipping targets connected to Israel, the Houthis appear to have attacked maritime commerce indiscriminately. They have struck at vessels with no conceivable connection to Israel’s Gaza campaign. Most notably, the February 2024 sinking of the Lebanese-owned cargo ship Rubymar, carrying vital fertilizer cargo bound for Bulgaria, starkly reveals the disconnect between stated Houthi objectives and their actual military behavior. Another disturbing example was the sinking of the Tutor in June, carrying coal from Russia to India—entirely unrelated to Israel or the ongoing Gaza conflict.
Moreover, even if the Houthis genuinely intended to engage only selected shipping, the inherent complexity of maritime trade and insurance arrangements makes such precision nearly impossible. Commercial shipping firms and their insurance providers operate on concerns of risk and profit, not political assurances from a militia known for its fierce anti-Western rhetoric and proven unpredictability. This dynamic alone has produced dramatic consequences: we now observe a near 50% reduction in shipping traffic through the key Red Sea route since tensions rose, primarily as Western shipping companies scramble to re-route or curtail their voyages. Notably, Chinese vessels—backed by Beijing’s strategic determination and willingness to absorb risk—comprise a disproportionate number of the vessels that still transit this potentially hazardous corridor.
Critically, the assumption that disrupting shipping routes would pressure Israel into halting operations in Gaza—or force the U.S. and its allies to abandon support for Israel—is fundamentally flawed. It illustrates a deeply naïve understanding of how global alliance structures and great power politics function. Regardless of disagreements on moral or ethical dimensions of the Gaza-Israel conflict, American strategic calculus on Israel remains relatively immutable. Israel is not merely another regional security partner, but a longstanding cornerstone of Washington’s political and security strategy in the region. To suggest Washington might abandon or even recalibrate this deeply established partnership because a militia threatens maritime shipping routes fundamentally misreads the realities of geopolitical pressures and alliances.
Consider historical parallels. The United Kingdom’s decision to join World War I after Germany’s invasion of Belgium had little to do with intrinsic British concern for Belgium itself; rather, it was about the existential credibility of British guarantees and alliances. Like Britain in 1914, the United States simply cannot afford to appear vulnerable to coercion by militants, especially not when ample U.S. diplomatic and security guarantees are pledged to partners around the globe.
Thus, given those circumstances, it is not surprising that the American response has gradually shifted toward robust military intervention. Washington has made clear it views these Houthi attacks as direct affronts to freedom of navigation and its strategic credibility—not as some morally charged negotiation point over Israeli tactics in Gaza.
Certainly, from a purely realpolitik perspective, the Houthis might feel justified to employ disruption in shipping as a political tool. Yet their actions, no matter how loudly linked to claims of humanitarian solidarity with Gaza, are profoundly counterproductive to any realistic strategic objective. They can neither meaningfully influence Israeli military choices nor shake America’s resolve to back longstanding alliances.
In the end, the Houthis’ blockade rhetoric and their targeting of Red Sea shipping demonstrates a perilous misunderstanding—or deliberate disregard—for geopolitical realities. Far from forcing a course correction in Gaza or pushing Washington away from Israel, this strategy only deepens the crisis, forcing the United States to reaffirm its commitments to Israel through military escalation in order to protect strategic interests and uphold diplomatic credibility.
Consequently, the ongoing Houthi attacks have become a wholly separate issue divorced from Gaza itself. For better or worse, the calculus America faces now isn’t about Israeli conduct in Palestine’s territories, but rather about Washington’s ability to maintain credible alliances and project power globally.
To summarize plainly, despite their assertions and rhetorical flourishes, the Houthi blockade was doomed from its inception. Its intended strategic impacts—a halt to Israel’s Gaza operations or the erosion of U.S.-Israeli ties—were never achievable through maritime attacks alone. Instead, the Houthis have inadvertently guaranteed precisely the opposite outcome—an escalation in regional stakes far beyond the contours of their original issue.
